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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFTON J. HACKFORD, SHARON 
HACKFORD, RANDOLPH G. 
HACKFORD, and SANDRA H. ASAY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-v-
ALBERT LEO SNOW and 
CORWIN BARTON SNOW, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
ALBERT LEO SNOW, 
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, 
-v-
CLIFTON J. HACKFORD, et al., 
Defendants/Cross-
Respondents. 
Case No. 17067 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND 
DEFENDANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves two actions consolidated 
for trial: An action by plaintiffs/appellants (herein-
after "appellants") against defendants/respondents 
(hereinafter "respondents") for unlawful detainer, and 
an action by respondents against appellants for specific 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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performance of a lease agreement and option to purchase 
certain properties which are the subject of both actions. 
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 12th day of February, 1980, Kenneth 
E. Anderton, sitting by designation as a Judge of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, entered a judgment dismissing appellant's 
Complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents 
and granting judgment for respondents on their Complaint 
for specific performance of a lease and option agreement 
of the parties, and awarded damages and costs to appel-
lants and respondents on the various claims and counter-
claims at issue in each action. 
On the 7th day of April, 1980, the lower 
court entered a further order amending the judgment 
in several particulars. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse 
the findings and judgment of the lower court, and 
specifically, to find and declare that appellants 
are entitled to judgment against respondents for their 
unlawful detainer upon appellants' lands, and that 
-2-
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respondents are not entitled to a judgment for specific 
performance of the lease and option agreement of the 
parties, and to assess damages and costs against re-
spondents according to the evidence adduced at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In April, 1975, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
and respondent Corwin Barton Snow negotiated an Agree-
ment wherebyrespondents were to lease and have an 
option to purchase certain lands owned by all appel-
lants and described in the Agreement as: ''Neola, 
(420 acre Hackford farm), Uintah County, State of 
Utah." (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4). None of the 
other appellants or respondent Leo Snow participated 
in any of the negotiations regarding the Agreement 
and each signed the Agreement at different times prior 
to its execution by appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
and respondent Corwin Barton Snow. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
10-13, 20-21, 106, 122-123). 
The Agreement was drawn on a standard Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer To Lease form by Sherman Culp, 
a real estate agent and friend of respondent Corwin 
Barton Snow, at his instance and request (Tr. Vol. 
-3-
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I, p. 39) . 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford was a married 
man at the time of the Agreement and the name of his 
wife, Sharon Hackford, appears on one of the two original 
drafts of the Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 
4). However, Sharon Hackford testified that she never 
signed the Agreement and respondent Corwin Barton 
Snow testified that he was aware that she had not 
signed the Agreement (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 128-130; 
49). 
Although the Agreement provides on its face 
(lines 36-38) that appellants and respondents agreed 
to execute "a written lease which will supercede and 
abrogate this agreement" "within 10 days after tender 
of a firm lease prepared by the landlord in a form 
consistent with the above provisions and containing 
other customary and reasonable general provisions" 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4), the parties never 
executed a formal written lease. 
The 420 acres subject to the Agreement was 
part of a larger tract of approximately 640 acres 
comprising the Hackford farm (Tr. Vol. I, p. 52; De-
-4-
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fendants• Exhibit 6). At the time the Agreement was 
made, approximately 555 acres of the farm were involved 
in an action styled Pumper's Inc. v. Clifton K. Hackford, 
et al., Civil No. 7180, pending in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Uintah County, State of Utah. This 
was an action to partition the lands in question between 
Pumper's, which had purchased an interest in the land, 
and Clifton Kermit Hackford, Randolph G. Hackford 
and Sandra Hackford Asay, appellants herein (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 32 ; Defendants Exhibit 6). An additional 85 
acres not at issue in the Pumper's case but referred 
to in the Decree therein was owned by appellant Clifton 
J. Hackford in his own right (Tr. Vol. I, 22-23, 26; 
Defendants' Exhibits 6 and 7). 
At the time of the negotiation of the Agreement, 
appellant Clifton J. Hackford was not certain that 
appellants would retain more than 445 acres of the 
Hackford farm as a result of the Pumper's litigation 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30, 52). Appellants therefore deter-
mined to lease 420 acres of the 445 to respondents 
and to retain a five acre parcel surrounding appellant 
Clifton J. Hackford's home and 20 acres of hay ground 
-5-
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(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 69, 108, 113). Appellant Clifton 
J. Hackford testified that during the negotiation 
of the Agreement he indicated to respondent Corwin 
Barton Snow that appellants might retain their 20 
acres of hay ground near the five acre parcel surrounding 
his home, but that he could not make a final decision 
as to where appellants would retain their 20 acres 
of hay ground without consulting with the other appel-
lants, each of whom lived some distance from him (Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 69, 98-99, 105, 108, 117). The Agreement 
contains no reference or description of the 25 acres 
of land retained by appellants which were not subject 
to the Agreement of April, 1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41,46). 
Appellants Clifton Kermit Hackford, Randolph 
G. Hackford and Sandra Hackford Asay, each testified 
that they did not discuss or determine where they 
would retain the 20 acres of hay ground until some 
time after the Agreement was signed. At that time, 
they determined to reserve the 20 acres of hay ground 
in the southeast of the southwest section where the 
oil well is now located (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 17, 120-121, 
124; Defendants' Exhibit 5-20 acre section labeled 
"NOT IN CONTRACT"). 
-6-
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Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that 
during 1975 and 1976, he and respondent Corwin Barton 
Snow entered into a verbal agreement whereby respondent 
Corwin Barton Snow was permitted to take hay from 
the 20 acres of appellants' hay ground not subject 
to the Agreement of April, 1975, in exchange for pro-
viding a certain amount of hay to appellants for their 
livestock, and based on respondent Snow's agreement 
to pay the taxes and assessments on appellant's hay 
ground (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 99-100, 154). Respondent 
Corwin Barton Snow acknowledged the existence of these 
verbal agreements with appellant Clifton J. Hackford, 
but stated that he believed that the verbal agreements 
related to 20 acres of land near appellant Clifton 
J. Hackford's home. On cross-examination, however, 
respondent Corwin Barton Snow admitted that there 
was not 20 acres of hay adjacent to appellant Hackford's 
home and that he stacked the hay he removed from the 
property purusant to the verbal agreement down by 
the oil well where appellants claim they retained 
their 20 acres of hay ground (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 48-49). 
In the fall of 1975, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
constructed fences around appellants' 20 acres of 
-7-
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hay ground not subject to the Agreement of April, 
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 74). 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that 
he did not see respondent Corwin Barton Snow on the 
Hackford farm after the Fall of 1976, and that the 
parties had no verbal agreement with respect to re-
spondent's use of hay from appellant's hay ground 
after 1976 (Tr. Vol., p. 84, 95, 99-100). 
On January 25, 1977, appellants and their 
respective spouses entered into an Oil and Gas Lease 
with Flying Diamond Oil Corporation (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
12) and an oil well was erected on appellants' 20 acres 
of hay ground not subject to the Agreement of April, 
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 70, 100). At no time during 
or subsequent to the construction of the oil well 
did either of the respondents assert any claim that 
the well was constructed on land subject to the Agree-
ment in April, 1975, or take any legal action to contest 
the construction of the well (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 70-71). 
Mr. Leslie Brown, who was employed to take readings 
on the well's activity during June and July, 1977, 
and was at the well during every other sixteen hour 
period throughout those two months, testified that 
-8-
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on no occasion did either of respondents ever claim 
that "the well was constructed on property subject 
to the Agreement of April, 1975, or undertake legal 
action to eject him or the oil company from the property 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 191-193). 
Marvin Huber, a hired hand, testified that 
he cut hay on appellants' hay ground during both the 
"first" and "second" cuttings of 1977 an::i was paid for his 
work by appellant Clifton J. Hackford. Mr. Huber 
testified that he cut hay on other parts of the Hackford 
farm during 1977 and was paid for this work by respon-
dent Leo Snow (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 87, 150-151, 153). 
Johnnie Reber, another hired hand, testified that 
he bailed hay on appellants' hay ground during the 
"third" cutting in August, 1977, and was paid for 
his work by appellant Clifton J. Hackford. Appellant 
Clifton Kermit Hackford cut the hay on appellants' 
hay ground in August, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 156-157, 
161). At no time on any of these occasions did either 
of respondents claim that the hay removed from appellants' 
hay ground was subject to the Agreement of April, 
1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 265-266). 
Pursuant to the Agreement of April, 1975, 
-9-
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respondents, as tenants, agreed to pay "Real Property 
Tax" and any "Increase above 1974 Real Property Tax" 
and to "maintain the fences and property water system" 
on the property subject of the Agreement (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 1 and 4). 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that 
water assessments were due on April 1 of each year 
and that he so advised respondent Corwin Barton Snow 
at the time the Agreement was negotiated (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 73). In 1975, the water assessment was paid 
a month late and then was only paid after appellants 
made several telephone calls to respondent Corwin 
Barton Snow to obtain payment of the assessment (Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 73-74; Defendants' Exhibits 13 and 14). 
In 1976, appellant Clifton J. Hackford mended 
the fences on the property and telephoned.respondent 
Corwin Barton Snow and reminded him of respondents' 
obligation to maintain the fences on the property 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 75). 
Although appellants Clifton J. Hackford and 
Clifton Kermit Hackford made numerous requests and 
demands of respondents, respondents failed and refused 
to pay the 1976 water assessments which remained due 
-10-
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and delinquent as of February of 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, 
P· 75; Defendants' Exhibit 13; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
14). At that time, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
received a notice from the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Agency, United States Department of the Interior, 
that he would receive no further water during 1977 
until the assessment for 1976 was paid (Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 8; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 75-76). Thereafter, 
respondent Leo Snow finally paid the 1976 water assess-
ment but appellant Clifton J. Hackford was billed 
penalty charges and interest on the 1976 water assess-
ment which he was forced to pay in order to obtain 
water for his property during the 1977 irrigation 
session· (Defendants' Exhibit 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 143). 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford also testified 
that respondents failed to pay the property taxes 
on the 420 acres subject of the lease agreement when 
the taxes fell due on November, 1976. Finally, the 
taxes were advertised as delinquent in a local newspaper 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 78). 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that 
on or about April 17, 1977, respondent Leo Snow came 
to the Hackford farm to make the annual lease payment. 
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Clifton J. Hackford and his son, appellant Clifton 
Kermit Hackford, informed respondent Leo Snow that 
the water assessment for 1977 had not been paid, and 
that they were going to terminate the Agreement of 
April, 1975, for respondents repeated breach thereof 
in failing to make timely payments of the property 
taxes and water assessments on the property subject 
to the Agreement (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81). Respondent 
Leo Snow then promised appellants that if they would 
accept the annual lease payment, that he would keep 
up his obligations under the Agreement and pay the 
outstanding water assessments for 1977 together with 
the interest thereon within three (3) days. Appellants 
agreed to accept the annual lease payment from respon-
dent Snow only on the condition that he follow through 
on his representations that he would perform his obliga-
tions under the Agreement (Id.). 
Appellant Clifton J. Hackford testified that 
at the time he accepted the 1977 lease payment from 
respondent Leo Snow in April, 1977, that respondent 
Snow asked him to take a water turn on the leased 
property in May, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 82). When appel-
lant Hackford went to the head ditch to release the 
-12-
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water in May, 1977, he was unable to take the water 
turn because respondents had permitted the ditches 
to become filled with so much dirt and debris during 
the Fall of 1976, that the spring run off in 1977 
simply washed over the ditch and created large gullies 
and washouts over a large area of appellants' property 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 83). Appellant Hackford telephoned 
Sheriff Kenneth P. Pickup, who took several photographs 
of the washouts and gullies (Defendants' Exhibit 15; 
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 83, 159). 
After discovering the extensive erosion and 
damage to appellants' land, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
telephoned respondent Leo Snow and informed him that 
respondents' failure to maintain the ditches on the 
property had resulted in extreme damage to appellants' 
land and that appellants were going to terminate the 
Agreement of April, 1975 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 211-212). 
Respondent Leo Snow promised that he would have the 
ditches cleaned but did nothing in this regard. Finally, 
appellant Clifton J. Hackford cleaned the ditches 
himself (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 83-34). 
Following appellants' acceptance of the annual 
lease ~ayment from respondent Leo Snow in April, 1977, 
-13-
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upon his promise to pay the outstanding water assess-
ments and interest thereon within three days, respondent 
Leo Snow did not pay the 1977 water assessment within 
three days, or thereafter, although he continued to 
promise appellants that he would do so (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 108-109). 
In June, 1977, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
was contacted by one Sonny Grand of the Uintah and 
Ouray Irrigation Office and advised that unless 1977 
water assessments were paid, that appellants would 
not receive any water on their property after July 
1, 1977 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 81-82). Since appellant 
Hackford had been watering the hay on appellants' 
20 acres not subject to the Agreement of April, 1975, 
and growing a garden on the five acre parcel surrounding 
his house, he could not afford to lose the water rights 
based upon respondents' continued non-payment (Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 80-82; Defendants' Exhibit 10). Therefore, 
appellant Clifton J. Hackford contacted all of the 
other appellants and collected the money to pay the 
1977 water assessment which he paid on June 30, 1977 
(Id.). Respondent Leo Snow admitted that he never 
paid the 1977 water assessment despite his repeated 
-14-
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promises to do so (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 212-213). 
On July 7, 1977, appellants directed Albert 
Colton, an attorney in Vernal, Utah, to formally notify 
respondents of the termination of the Agreement of 
April, 1975, for their continued and notorious breaches 
thereof and attorney Colton sent a letter to respondents 
so advising them on the same date (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
84-85; Defendants' Exhibit 11). 
On July 15, 1977, respondent Leo Snow and 
his attorney, John Beaslin, appeared at the home of 
appellant Clifton J. Hackford and attempted to persuade 
appellant to accept a check for the 1977 water assess-
ments that appellants had been forced to pay. On 
the same occasion, attorney Beaslin informed appellant 
Clifton J. Hackford that respondents were prepared 
to pay appellants the full purchase price, but neither 
respondent Snow nor Mr. Beaslin attempted to tender 
payment at that time (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 85-86, 158). 
On this occasion, appellant Clifton J. Hackford led 
respondent Leo Snow and attorney Beaslin down through 
the fields and indicated the extensive washouts and 
gullies that had been created as a result of respondent's 
failure to maintain the ditches, and further indicated 
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that respondents' failure to pay the water assessments 
and taxes had created considerable hardship to the 
appellants, and that, considering that respondents 
had continued to breach the parties' Agreement, that 
appellants had terminated the lease and would accept 
no further payments from respondents (Id.). 
Subsequent to the formal termination of the 
Agreement by the letter of July 7, 1977, respondent 
Leo Snow entered and trespassed upon appellants' lands 
and removed hay therefrom (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 87-88). 
Following this incident, appellants served respondent 
Leo Snow with a further Notice of Termination of Lease 
Agreement and Notice of Eviction and Requirement to 
Vacate Premises Within Three Days (R. 7-8; Tr. Vol. 
I, pp. 223-225; Defendants' Exhibit 17). 
On October 17, 1977, respondent Leo Snow filed 
a Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
seeking specific performance of the lease and option 
provisions of the Agreement of April, 1975 (R. 50-54). 
On February 6, 1978, appellants filed an action 
for Unlawful Detainer and other damages against respondents 
R. 1-9). 
On April 11, 1978, a pretrial conference was 
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held in reference to both actions. on that occasion. 
respondents filed a tender offer for the full purchase 
price of the property with the Court (R. 78-79}. At 
the conference, respondents represented to the Court 
that there should be a temporary order with respect 
to temporary possession of the land and stated that 
respondent Leo Snow had farmed the property for three 
years. Appellants argued that Leo Snow had never 
farmed the property and that his lease thereof had 
been cancelled for breach thereof and that respondents 
had been evicted. Following this exchange, the Court, 
per Judge J. Robert Bullock stated "I'm not about 
to upset the status quo with an order unless I hear 
testimony and evidence and so on." (See Transcript 
of Pretrial Hearing, pp. 14-16, contained in an envelope 
at R. 227). 
Subsequent to the pretrial conference, the 
Court entered an order consolidating the parties' 
actions but entered no Order with respect to which 
of the parties should have possession of the property 
subject of the Agreement pending the trial, or respecting 
the right of either party to use irrigation waters 
on the lands (Id.). 
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On April 17, 1978, respondents' counsel, without 
filing any Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 
or Preliminary Injunction in the district court, and 
without notice to appellants' counsel as required 
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
arranged a telephone call with Judge J. Robert Bullock, 
during the course of which His Honor entered an Order 
in the nature of a Preliminary Injunction granting 
respondents possession of the property subject to 
the Agreement of April, 1975, pending trial (R. 91-92). 
During this conversation there was absolutely no dis-
cussion of the right of either party to pay legal 
assessments for the use of water on the premises during 
the pendency of the parties' actions (R. 17-28). 
On May 9, without filing any proper Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injuc-
tion, and without notice to appellants' counsel or 
the opportunity for hearing required pursuant to Rule 
65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respondents' 
counsel, John c. Beaslin, obtained an ex parte order 
from the Fourth Judicial District Court, per Judge 
David Sam, ordering that appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
"be t~mporarily restrained from interfering with the 
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use by plaintiff of irrigation water belonging to 
and used upon the lands which are the subject of this 
action. It is the intent of the Court that plaintiff 
be allowed the use of the water as well as the land 
as heretofore ordered by this Court until further 
order of this Court" (R. 87-88). This order also 
required appellant Clifton J. Hackford to appear and 
show cause"why he should not be held in contempt of 
court for willfully interfering with plaintiff's possession 
of the lands contrary to the terms of the Order issued 
at the hearing on April 17" (R. 87-88). 
On or after May 9, 1978, without any notice 
to appellants or their counsel, respondent Leo Snow 
delivered a copy of the Order of May 9, 1978, to officials 
of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Agency, and demanded 
under authority thereof, the right to pay the 1978 
water assessments, which appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
had previously refused to accept from respondent Snow 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 95-96, 225-229, 268). The May 9 Order 
on its face shows that it gave respondent Leo Snow 
no authority or right to make the water assessment 
payments regarding the water rights of appellant Clifton 
J. Hackford (R. 87-88). 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the occasion that appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
appeared before Judge David Sam on the Order To Show 
C.ause contained in the Order of May 9, 1978, the contempt 
charge against appellant Clifton J. Hackford was dismissed 
and Judge Sam vacated his order of May 9, 1978, and 
reserved the costs and attorney's fees to be assessed 
against respondents until the time of trial (R. 101). 
On June 21, 1978, appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
hired Marvin Huber to cut the hay on appellants' 20 
acres of hay ground not subject to the Agreement of 
April, 1975. When Mr. Huber attempted to cut the 
hay, respondent Leo Snow informed Mr. Huber that he 
would have him arrested if he attempted to cut the 
hay (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 89-90, 151-152, 185-192). 
On July 22, 1978, respondent Leo Snow's employee, 
Guy Whiting, attempted to remove hay from appellants' 
hay ground and was given a ticket for trespassing 
on appellants' lands by Sheriff Murray (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 91-92). 
On July 31, 1978, respondent ~eo Snow permitted 
57 head of his cattle to trespass upon the 5 acre 
parcel of land surrounding appellant Clifton J. Hackford's 
home and to destroy appellant Hackford's vegetable 
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garden (Vol. I, pp. 19-93). Sheriff Kenneth P. Pickup 
investigated the incident. Although another man whose 
cattle had also trampled the garden, offered to pay 
appellant Clifton J. Hackford for the damage, respondent 
Leo Snow did not (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-175, 203-205). 
Leo snow represented to Sheriff Pickup on that occasion 
that he owned the 5 acre parcel surrounding appellant 
Clifton J. Hackford's home (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 218-219) 
although responden~s' counsel, at trial, represented 
that respondents claimed no interest therein (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 26). 
On August 2, 1978, respondent Leo Snow shot 
the lock off the gate to the five acre parcel of land 
surrounding the home of appellant Clifton J. Hackford 
and cut and removed 722 bales of hay from the property 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 93, 176-182). 
Throughout the trial of this action, over 
the continuing objection of counsel for appellants, 
the Court admitted parol evidence, in the form of 
testimony from respondents, to establish which of 
the lands comprising the Hackford farm were included 
and excluded from the 420 acres subject to the Agreement 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 36, 37, 46, 56, 58, 146). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS 
UNLAWFULLY DETAINED ON THE PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT AFTER RECIEV-
ING NOTICE OF APPELLANTS' TERMINATION 
OF THE AGREEMENT FOR RESPONDENTS' 
BREACH THEREOF. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS' BREACHES 
OF THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR APPELLANTS' 
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT. 
"Except where there are special circumstances 
which would render a forfeiture unconscionable, or where 
the breach is trivial and not willful, the lessor 
may terminate the lease, pursuant to a provision for 
forfeiture therein, where the lessee does not fulfill 
his covenant to pay taxes or other assessments on 
the leased property." 51 C.J.S. 108. This Court 
expressed the identical view in Bacon v. Park, 57 
P. 28 (Utah 1899), holding that: 
Where due payment of taxes is one of 
the covenants of a lease, and the 
taxes are allowed to become delinquent 
. . . (no demand is necessary) before 
declaring a forfeiture ..• Equity 
will not relieve against the forfeiture 
of a lease for breach of a covenant 
when the breach has been culpable, 
long persisted in and detrimental. 
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See also, Anno. 93 A.L.R. 1243. The same result ob-
tained in Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, 381 P.2d 
735, 736 (Utah 1963), in which this Court held that 
the failure of a tenant to pay taxes and insurance 
premiums she covanted to pay under a lease agreement 
constituted a material breach of the lease for which 
the lessor could terminate the lease. 
This Court has also recognized that the forfeiture 
of a lease is justified for the improper use, prohibited 
transfer or neglect of the leasehold, Gerard v. Young, 
432 P.2d 343 (1967), and neighboring courts have also 
so held. Bolon v. Pennington, 432 P.2d 274 (Arizona 
1974); Freeman v. Rose, 188 N.W.2d 683 (Neb. 1971); 
Eliason v. Eliason, 443 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1968); Bentler 
v. Poulson, 141 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1966). 
In Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 
889, 891 (Utah 1976), cert. den. 1976, this Court 
held: 
Parties are free to contract according 
to their desires in whatever terms 
they can agree upon and forfeiture 
is to be allowed where the terms 
of the agreement are clear. 
Also, in Jacobsen v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 
1954), this Court noted that: 
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It is only when the forfeiture would 
be so grossly excessive as to be en-
tirely dispoportionate to any possible 
loss that might have been contemplated, 
so that to enforce it would shock 
the conscience, that a court of 
equity will refuse to enforce the 
provision. 
In the instant case, the evidence is uncontro-
verted that respondents covenanted under the Agreement 
of April, 1975, to pay all property taxes and assessments 
and to maintain the fences and water system on the 
property subject of the Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1 and 4, lines 25-27). The Agreement contains an 
unequivocal forf ei tur.e provision for the breach of 
these covenants, providing that: 
In the event the tenant fails to 
execute said lease as herein provided, 
the amounts paid hereon shall, at the 
option of the landlord, be retained 
as liquidated and agreed damges, or 
landlord may _elect to retain said sum 
and to require specific performance. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 4, lines 39-40). 
It is uncontested that from the inception 
of the Agreement of April, 1975, respondents failed 
to make timely water assessment and property tax payments 
and that this continued throughout 1975, 1976 and 
1977 to the extent that the property taxes for 19 
were advertised as delinquent in a local newspaper 
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and appellants were given notice that they would lose 
their irrigation rights for the 1977 season unless 
the assessments were paid, at which point appellants 
were forced to pay the assessments (Supra, pp. 10-16). 
Likewise, the respondents did not contest that they 
failed to maintain the ditches and water system on 
the property subject to the Agreement in the fall 
of 1976, with the result that in the spring of 1977, 
the water ran over the filled ditches and created 
substantial damage in the form of washouts and gullies 
to appellants' property (Supra, pp. 12 - 16). The 
evidence adduced at trial also shows that appellants 
continually notified respondents of their breaches 
of the Agreement and respondents repeatedly pledged 
to cure their breaches but failed to do so (Supra, 
pp. 10 - 16 The evidence shows that respondents' 
breaches of the Agreement of April, 1975, were "culpable, 
long persisted in and detrimental." They were breaches 
of the nature which this Court has consistently held 
to constitute justification for the termination of 
a lease agreement. Therefore, appellants submit that 
the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that 
such breaches did not constitute grounds for appellants' 
termination of the lease Agreement of April, 1975. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT 
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, 
EXCEPT BY INSTITUTING AN ACTION AGAINST 
RESPONDENTS FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court 
held that: 
... The letter of July 7, sent by 
defendants' (appellants herein) counsel 
to plaintiffs did not terminate the 
lease, and so holds. The Earnest Money 
Agreement contained no provisions for 
termination of the lease for violation 
of its terms and the proper procedure 
for termination was under the Forcible 
Entry and Detainer statutes of the State 
of Utah. 
(R. 209-210). 
Although at common law lease agreements were 
almost always terminated by the terms of the lease, 
today a lease may also be terminated by the operation 
of law. This means that although there is no specific 
provision in the lease allowing termination, the law 
will consider the lease at an end by looking at the 
intent and cci:ions of the parties. Such termination 
often takes the form of terminations for reasons of 
frustration, surrender, or forfeiture. B.Y.U., Summary 
of Utah Property Law, Vol. 2, p. 572 (1978). The 
decisions of this Court are uniform in holding that 
the lessee's breach of covenants to pay taxes and 
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assessments, or breach of any covenant which results 
in the misuse or damage of the leasehold, constitutes 
grounds for the termination of a lease by operation 
of law. Bacon v. Park, supra; Russell v. Park City 
Utah Corp., supra; Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, 
supra; Gerald v. Young, supra. 
Assuming then, that respondents' breaches 
of the Agreement of April, 1975, did constitute sufficient 
grounds for appellants to declare the termination 
and forfeiture thereof pursuant to law (See, Argument, 
Point I (A), supra), appellants submit that they could 
enforce the termination of the Agreement simply by 
giving proper notice thereof, and that they would 
not, contrary to the trial court's decision, be forced 
to initiate an action for unlawful detainer to terminate 
the Agreement, although appellants might be required 
to initiate such action in order to regain possession. 
In Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, supra, 
the lessor, after the lessee had failed to pay taxes 
and insurance premiums on the leased premises in accord-
ance with her covenants in the lease agreement, declared 
a termination of the Agreement and declared the termina-
tion of the agreement in a letter to the lessee. 
The trial court held that the "letter of March 24, 
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1960 terminated the lease" and this Court upheld that 
determination, noting that the lessor therein properly 
initiated an action for unlawful detainer to regain 
possession of the leased premises when the lessee 
refused to relinquish the premises. 
In the case at bar, the evidence is uncontested 
that appellant Clifton J. Hackford telephoned respondent 
Leo Snow in May, 1977, and informed him of appellants' 
intention to terminate the Agreemer.t of April, 1977, 
and that appellants later had Albert Colton, an attorney 
in Vernal, Utah, send a letter to respondents formally 
informing them of the termination of the lease and 
detailing respondents' breaches thereof. (See supra, 
pp. 13 - ls). Appellants submit that these actions 
provided respondents with all the notice of their 
default and breech of the Agreement of April, 1975, 
and appellants' action in terminating the Agreement 
required by law. See generally, Day v. Smith, 30 
P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1934); Independence Flying Service 
Inc. v. Abitz, 386 S.W. 2d 399, 404 (Mo. 1965); Moore 
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 377 P.2d 32, 35 (Ore. 1962). 
When respondents refused to vacate the premises subject 
of the Agreement of April, 1975, the evidence is clear 
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that appellants did institute an action for unlawful 
detainer to regain possession of their land, but this 
action was not for the purpose of terminating the 
lease or required for termination of the Agreement 
of ·April, 1975 (See supra, pp. 15 - 16 ). The decisional 
law contained in the Annotations to the Utah Focible 
Entry and Detainer statutes, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-2 
(1953 as amended), pp. 436, 439, is uniform in holding 
that an action for unlawful detainer is instituted 
for the purpose of "regaining possession" and is not 
necessary to the termination of the lease agreement. 
Based upon the foregoing, appellants respectfully 
submit that the trial court erred in holding that 
appellants could not effectively terminate the Agreement 
of April, 1975, except by resorting to an action against 
respondents for unlawful detainer. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE CON-
TAINED IN THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975. 
A. APPELLANTS' TERMINATION OF THE AGREE-
MENT OF APRIL, 1975, ALSO TERMINATED 
RESPONDENTS' OPTION TO PURCHASE CON-
TAINED IN THE AGREEMENT. 
Under Utah law, the termination of a lease 
agreement containing an option to purchase also terminates 
the option, if the lease and option covenants are 
entirely interdependent and indivisable. In Russell 
v. Park City Corp., supra, this court held that a 
right of purchase granted the lessee under the lease 
agreement fell with the lease upon its termination. 
In that c~se, the lessee disputed the termination 
and also argued that the right to purchase the leased 
property contained in the lease agreement survived 
the termination of the lease. This Court, in denying 
the lessee's contention, applied the following rule: 
If by the express terms of the option, 
it can be seen as independent of the 
other covenants of the lease, and is 
supported by valid consideration, it 
can continue in existence notwithstanding 
the lease's termination. 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
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This Court affirmed the finding of the lower court 
that no separate consideration supported the option, 
and that the option therefore ceased to exist at the 
time the lease agreement was terminated. 
In Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, supra, 
at 736, this Court held that the trial court acted 
properly in declining to grant specific performance 
of an option contained in a lease agreement where 
the lessee did not attempt to exercise the option 
prior to the lessor's termination of the lease agreement. 
In the case at bar, the Agreement of April, 1975, 
shows that respondents gave no separate consideration 
for the option to purchase contained in the Agreement, 
and that appellants formally notified respondents 
of the termination of the Agreement and Option by 
the letter dated July 7, 1977 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1 and 4; supra, p. 16). Thereafter, respondents 
notified appellants of their desire to exercise the 
option and to reimburse appellants for the water assess-
ment payments which appellants were forced to pay 
in order to protect their irrigation rights after 
respondents' default in making the payments (Supra, 
pp. 15 - 17). Appellants did not accept these or 
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or any other proposed payments from respondents subse-
quent to their termination of the Agreement and option 
(Id. ) . 
Since the Agreement of April~ 1975, and the 
option to purchase contained therein were completely 
dependent and interrelated and not supported by separate 
consideration, appellants submit that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to find that appellants' 
termination of the Agreement also terminated the option 
contained therein. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE 
ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE CONTAINED IN 
THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, WHEN 
RESPONDENTS WERE IN BREACH OF THE 
AGREEMENT AT THE TIME THEY ATTEMPTED 
TO EXERCISE THE OPTION. 
Several courts have held that where lease 
and option provisions are not independent, but consti-
tute parts of one entire contract, that the breach 
of the lease amounts to a failure of consideration 
for the accompanying option to purchase, such that 
the option is lost, the consideration for the option 
being the fulfillment of the covenants of the lease 
agreement. Annotation, 115 A.L.R. 376. 
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Thus, in Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 
supra, this Court observed that an option contained 
in a lease agreement is only enforceable after the 
termination of the lease agreement if the option agree-
ment is either separate from the lease or severable 
from the lease. In Shoemaker v. Pioner Investments, 
supra, this Court declined to order specific performance 
of an option to purchase property subject to a lease 
.agreement where the lease agreement had been terminated 
by the lessor for the lessee's nonpayment of taxes 
and insurance premiums. 
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates 
beyond peradventure that respondents were in breach 
of the lease Agreement of April, 1975, at the time 
appellants terminated the Agreement for respondents' 
nonpayment of property taxes and water assessments, 
and respondents' failure to maintain water systems 
on the property which resulted in severe damage to 
the land, and that appellants' termination of Agreement 
was due to this conduct on the part of respondents 
(Supra, 10-16 ). The letter formally notifying 
respondents of the termination of the Agreement sets 
forth the nature of respondents' breaches thereof 
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in detail (Defendants' Exh. 17) and respondents 
did not actually tender performance of the option 
until March, 1978 (R. 76-79). 
Since the option and Agreement of April, 1975, 
were not separate or independent and respondents were 
in breach of the Agreement at the time they attempted 
to exercise the option to purchase the property subject 
to the Agreement, the trial court erred in ruling 
that respondents were entitled to specific performance 
of the option to purchase. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT TO 
THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL, 1975, WAS 
DESCRIBED WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY 
TO JUSTIFY THE COURT IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENTS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY 
CONTAINED THEREIN. 
In Davidson v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 
1973), this Court held that a real estate contract 
is not valid unless the land subject to the contract 
is clearly and unarnbigously described. This Court 
further held that parole evidence was only admissible 
to apply, not supply the description of land in a 
contract. In that regard, this Court observed: 
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Parole evidence will not be admitted 
to complete a defective description, 
or to show the intention with which 
it was made. Parole evidence may be 
used for the purpose of identifying 
the description contained in the 
writing with its locations upon the 
ground, but not for the purpose of 
ascertaining and locating the land 
about which the parties negotiated, 
and that of supplying and adding to 
a description insufficient and void 
on its face. 
Appellants submit that the instant case is 
governed by Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
In that case, this Court held that a real estate contract 
which did not provide with certaintly which 30 acres 
of the plaintiffs' 189 acre tract were to be conveyed 
to the defendants, could not support a decree of specific 
performance because the description of the land in 
the contract was deemed to be too indefinite. 
As in Lauritzen, the evidence shows that appellants 
and respondents did not provide with any certainty 
which 420 acres of appellants' 445 acres were subject 
to the parties' Agreement of April, 1975 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 1 and 4). The trial court, over appellants' 
objection, permitted respondents to offer parole evidence 
consisting of respondents' testimony as to where the 
420 acres subject to the contract was located, and 
-35-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where the 25 acres not subject to the contract was 
located (Supra, p. 21). Appellants testified that 
the 25 acres not subject to the Agreement of April, 
1975, were located in one area of the property and 
respondents testified that these same lands were located 
in a different place than appellants maintained. 
The evidence demonstrates that both appellants and 
respondents conducted activities on the sections of 
the Hackford farm claimed to be "included" and "excluded" 
from the Agreement according to the conflicting testimony 
of appellants and respondents, and that each party 
continued to claim different acreage was "included" 
or "excluded" from the Agreement, after the parties 
filed their separate actions in the district court 
and throughout the trial of the parties' consolidated 
actions (Supra, pp. 10-25). On similar facts, this 
Court refused to compel specific performance in Lauritzen. 
Respondents have argued that Brady v. Fausett, 
546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976) is dispositive of this issue. 
Since counsel for respondents argued that case before 
this Court, they should be informed that Brady is 
readily distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Brady, this Court held that a contract 
for the lease of land containing an option for purchase 
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was unenforceable on the theory of lack of specificity 
in the description of the land in the lease agreement 
where: 
the vendor prepared the contract and 
agreed to supply a description from 
documents at his disposal and in view 
of defendants' occupancy, operation 
and improvement of the properties. 
In this case, 11one of the factors critical to the 
Brady decision are present. 
First, in the instant case, the evidence indicates 
that appellants did not prepare the lease agreement. 
It is uncontroverted that the Agreement was prepared 
and drafted by one Sherman Culp, at the request of 
respondent Corwin Barton Snow (Supra, p. 3). 
Second, the appellants did not agree in the 
Agreement of April, 1975, to supply any further descrip-
tion of the leased premises from documents in their 
possession, as did the lessors in Brady. 
Third, unlike the lessors in Brady, appellants 
did not accept any payments from the respondents after 
appellants served notice upon respondents that the 
lease and option Agreement was terminated for respondents' 
breach thereof. 
Fourth, even if a description of the property 
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could be surmised from the parties' respective activities 
on the· lands deemed to be "included" or "excluded" 
from coverage by the Agreement of the parties, the 
evidence demonstrates that appellants' activities 
on the 20 acres appellants claim to have retained 
as their hay ground was far greater than that of re-
spondents. 
In conclusion, appellants submit that this 
Court has not either.implicitly or explicitly overruled 
its decision in Lauritzen by its pronouncements in 
Brady. As this Court noted in Lauritzen: 
A greater degree of certainty is 
required for specific performance 
in equity than is necessary to 
establish a contract as the basis 
of an action at law for damages. 
18 ut. 2d 368, 372. 
Based upon the foregoing, it was error for 
the trial court to hold that the description of the 
properties covered by the Agreement of April, 1975, 
was sufficient to support an award of specific perform-
ance, and the Court also erred in admitting parole 
evidence for the purpose of supplying an adequate 
description in the lease where none existed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellants respect-
fully request this Court to reverse the findings and 
judgment of the lower court, and specifically, to 
find and declare that appellants are entitled to judg-
ment against respondents for their unlawful detainer 
upon appellants' lands, and respondents are not entitled 
to a judgment for specific performance of the lease 
and option agreement of the parties, and to assess 
damages and costs against respondents according to 
the 1. 
of November, 1980. 
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